Polokwane signals a radical change in the political map of the country.
At the internal level, the ANC's 52nd national congress is likely to be a watershed in the way it runs its affairs (which used to be as a liberation movement) and chooses its leaders (by anointment). More fundamentally, however, the bad blood spilt between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma is such that Africa's oldest liberation movement - the party of Mandela, Tambo and Sisulu, of Luthuli, Moroka and Dube - is now more likely to split than kiss and make up. But the most likely immediate outcome is a sullen truce, as the adversaries assess the damage, sleep on it and regroup.
Founded in 1912, the ANC will be 100 years old when it gathers for its next national elective congress. It needed a shock to its ossified system to force it to modernise and catch up with its supporters.
If it stays together, chances are the ANC will re-examine its constitution and the way the organisation is run. What, for example, are its branches for, apart from selecting the leaders every five years? They have become nurseries of patronage and corruption, yet have inordinate power in the party-list electoral system. That is why the ANC needs to adopt some form of constituency-based system to ensure proper accountability to its electorate, rather than party bosses.
Whatever else may come in its wake, the Zuma bandwagon is warning the leadership to be more open. The old, top-down, semi clandestine ways of doing politics are obsolete. The ANC must reconnect with supporters in a more open way. It is useless pretending that personalities, power and "careerism" do not matter, and that only policy matters should be uppermost in people's minds.
There is something to be said for having a strong majority party, but a split into a more socialist-inclined party and a more market-friendly party would give the country the electoral choice it deserves and needs.
Even if this extreme outcome - a split - is avoided, the Zuma phenomenon has highlighted the gap between ruler and the ruled. The leadership that returned from exile never really understood that the people took the initiative and started organising for change from the early 1970s through June 1976 and the mass democratic movement of the 1980s. They had a say. Mbeki epitomised an "exile" attitude that it is enough to demonstrate superior knowledge, that the people would be grateful and follow, content with exercising a perfunctory policy conference vote every five years. Support for Zuma is a revolt against all that - though the descent into thuggish intolerance at Polokwane was frightening.
Whatever happens, we can expect a rather different ANC, and therefore a different country. The last time a ruling party faced serious internal rebellion in SA was in 1982, when Andries Treurnicht challenged the leadership of President P W Botha. But Treurnicht was forced out into opposition and Botha's grip on white politics was consolidated. Here the battle is unresolved, so a threshold has now been crossed into uncharted territory. The old cliché about a week being a long time in politics has never been more relevant.
The danger now exists that, with Zuma as new president of the ruling party, there could be paralysis in important areas of policy - especially over economic policy. The populist, left-wing supporters who bayed for Mbeki to make way for Zuma will surely expect a more populist, left-of-centre approach, which almost by definition equates to fiscal profligacy and labour market inflexibility. It is unlikely that Zuma can simply put such expectations on hold, despite earlier assurances that the macro economic approach implemented under Mbeki and finance minister Trevor Manuel would not change. There could also be an effect on the practicalities of governing. Many ministers and directors-general (and the many aspirants to their positions) will have an eye on who will be running the show after 2009 - and will therefore be considering how to please that faction. This could lead at worst to administrative collapse, at best inertia, and the country cannot afford either.
To compound the uncertainty, after four years of relative stability, 2008 promises a lot more volatility on the economic front. Inflation has burst its target range, and a volatile currency and high interest rates all combine to dampen the growth outlook, which national treasury estimates at a conservative 4,5%, well down on the 5% expected this year.
The current account deficit, at R180bn or 8% of GDP, is already at its worst level in decades and will rely heavily on foreign investment to fund it. To date, foreigners have ploughed billions into SA's equity and bond markets, funding much of the deficit, but as an economist at a leading international bank puts it, "until Zuma gains credibility as a leader... funding could now be at risk".
If Mbeki and Manuel remain in control of government economic levers until 2009, the broad policy strokes won't be negated - but nor will there be much-needed economic reform. This could prove critical as government tries to achieve its AsgiSA target of 500 000 new jobs each year until 2014. The latest job numbers made worrying reading, with only 30 000 jobs created in the September quarter. The private sector is being relied upon heavily to lead the employment drive, but political uncertainty will make investors reluctant. And labour liberalisation, considered crucial by private-sector economists to stimulate job creation, is unlikely with Zuma as ANC boss and beholden to Cosatu.
And with Zuma as the country's president in waiting for 2009, we face the prospect of two centres of power, with all the discomfort that implies for governance of a two-nation society - rich and poor. The ANC has no experience of such terrain, and few assumptions can be made about how the arrangement will actually work.
Of course, a critical factor in the year ahead is the chance that Zuma will be prosecuted for fraud and corruption. And once the catharsis of the Zuma challenge to Mbeki is over, it is just possible the revolt will subside and members will rethink their support of a deeply flawed candidate.
Meanwhile, now that so much steam has been let off, we must hope that those who have new found power to influence events will proceed very cautiously indeed. It is easy to stimulate the mob, far more difficult to control it.
Ranking the Analysts 2009
